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Abstract 
The core aim of this study is to propose an approach to quantitate estimation of indices-based information subject 
to necessities of the National Risk Assessment (NRA) of money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risks. 
Mathematical formalization analysis for Ukraine based on 11 indices and indicators for years 2011-2015 subject 
to core areas of the overall situation in a country considered within its National Risk Assessment was carried out. 
Authors’ contribution covers scientific novelty that is a first-time analysis of a general situation in a jurisdiction in 
light of the National Risk Assessment’s requirements based on joint consideration of various indices and setting 
priority to areas of the overall country’s situation in the framework of conducted calculations. 
It was concluded that proposed approach is a valuable instrument for assessing priority of areas of the overall 
situation in the country for the National Risk Assessment’s purposes through a formalized mechanism ensuring 
high objectiveness.  
Practical significance of this study is a possibility to reach higher efficiency in allocation of available re-
sources for the participants of the National Risk Assessment, to reduce some costs considering flexibility 
of the approach allowing consideration of significant volumes of information, its updating and comparison. 
This research could become a starting point for further research. Considering complexity of existing indices, 
there is a necessity to study a mechanism of their correlation and mutual influence, analyze elasticity and 
joint behavior, and discover the areas of preferable influence on large range of purposes not only limited to 
the MRA of ML/TF risks. 
Keywords: national risk assessment, money laundering, terrorist financing, risks, indices.   
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays jurisdictions all over the world face with a necessity of holding a National Risk Assessment (NRA) 
of the money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risks subject to the requirements set in the FATF 
Recommendation [1]. The NRA shall provide reasons and facts comprehensive enough to ensure a distribution 
of powers and resources at the national level in accordance with clear and current understanding of the ML/TF 
risks. Herewith, the inherent level of existing ML/TF risks in a country is inseparably associated with its 
general situation. Consequently, understanding of general situation including political, economic, social sta-
bility etc. for any jurisdiction is an integral part of its NRA. Obviously, that in the course of the NRA, it is 
necessary to estimate the overall position of a country and perform it in the most efficient way spending 
minimum efforts and resources and providing a reliable conclusions. Existing indices and indicators cover the 
variety of issues allowing to have quantitate estimates of any area e.g., political stability, peace, terrorism, 
corruption, economic environment and social development, etc. These modern indices come from profound sci-
entific studies and rely on knowledge, comprehensive data and up-to-date methodology. Therefore, they could 
serve a valuable source of information to assess an overall situation of a country. The main aim of our study is 
to develop an approach for indices-based analysis subject to certain tasks of the NRA of the ML/TF risks. 
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2. Literature review 
This topic attracted our attention in the course of further research of the AML/CFT issues started in 2008, in 
particular, in the course of study of application of mathematical modelling methods for NRA. It became clear 
that indices-based analysis for the NRA could strengthen the prioritization of findings.  
Though the issue of the NRA of the ML/TF risks very often is covered by the reports and guidance of inter-
national organizations such as FATF [1, 4], OSCE [14], IMF [15] the World Bank [15], a range of approaches 
are to be considered. First, micro- and macroeconomic models on ML developed by number of researchers, 
including Donato Masciandaro [17, 18, 19, 20]. These microeconomic models are based in particular on the 
construction of utility function for criminals (including the use of elements of portfolio theory) and macroe-
conomic models usually aimed at determining the exposure (shares) of criminal sector in economy and their 
interpenetration and international expand. Secondly, let us bring your attention to interregional input-output 
model proposed by John Walker [16] and gravity model of Brigitte Unger [22] based on estimations of 
amounts derived from crime laundering which are mediated by certain countries. The World Bank approach 
is based on Bayesian network for assessing vulnerability of national AML/CTF systems [16] and the IMF 
approach is based on calculating the risk probability of successful legalization of funds received crime or 
financing of terrorism in certain countries adjusted by consequences of these events.  
Authors would like to bring your attention to the tools of the World Bank that provide assessment of certain 
areas in the overall position of a jurisdiction as political, economic, geographical and institutional environment 
at the national level. The assessment of the mentioned factors shall be backed by relevant information though 
there are no restrictions or minimum required sources of information to be considered. The tool of both first 
and second generation requires users to give subjective judgments considering such information. It is a dis-
putable issue because two aims are expected be reached at once: from one hand, flexibility of assessment and 
consideration of expertise are essential and, from the other hand, objectiveness and possibility to update and 
compare the estimations are required.    
Herewith, a group of researchers leaded also by Brigitte Unger [23] proposes an interesting approach to clus-
tering countries considering the AML/CFT issues by hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis with the 
Ward’s algorithm. The clustering was performed basing on 29 indicators including two World Bank indices: 
the index of government effectiveness and the index of corruption. There were considered minimum value, 
maximum value, mean and standard deviation of the indicators. 
So, a need for appropriate utilization of indices-based information exists and there are attempts to applicate 
them for NRA of ML/TF risks. At the same time, this issue is sensible due to numerous requirements and 
complexity of the nature of indices. 
National methodologies of NRA are basically adopted in legal documents such as laws and by-laws but these are 
documents with restricted access. Partially, several features of the approach applied are given in the public NRA 
reports. NRA public reports of Ireland, Ukraine, Canada, United Kingdom, Japan, Malaysia and Singapore [5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13] became valuable sources of information for this study demonstrating attempts of certain juris-
dictions in Singapore and Ukraine in particular to utilize indices-based analysis for NRA. From the other hand, 
UK, at the final stage of its NRA while evaluating the relative exposure of each sector to risk, amended its model 
to reduce the dependency on quantitative data and include factors for qualitative assessment.  
3. Methodology 
In the course of this study the methods of analysis and synthesis (to justify the necessity of indices-based 
analysis for assessment of an overall situation in a jurisdiction subject to the NRA purposes), system general-
ization (to determine the nature and identify areas for assessment of overall position of Ukraine concerning 
its NRA of ML/TF risks), comparative analysis (to determine the features of the actual approaches to NRA of 
certain jurisdictions) were applied. 
Means of visualization were applied to quantitative data for figures of 11 indices for the period from 2011 to 
2015 year to analyze the dynamics, fluctuations and position of their medians and figures for Ukraine by 
reference to minimum and maximum values. In addition, a histogramming was performed to group the indices 
concerning figures of their arithmetic means of absolute increases in lacking proportions in Ukraine.   
Statistical methods for structural analysis such as, mean, median, proportion and a performance indicator that 
is an absolute increment were applied for joint analysis of figures of 11 indices as for Ukraine. Composing a 
dataset for analysis, authors faced with the lack of some figures that is why the simulation methods were 
applied to substitute missing data. 
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4. Results of research 
To perform an effective NRA of ML/FT risks, it is necessary to develop an effective methodological apparatus 
allowing to carry out impartial, comprehensive and adequate assessment of the situation. Each jurisdiction 
conducts the NRA subject to its own methodology and no single approach exists. Thus, FATF provided the 
following general principles for the NRA conducting [4]. 
The first principle: the NRA contributors shall agree clearly on its purposes. It means, in particular, an obli-
gation to identify, assess, and understand ML/TF risks for the country, and take action and apply resources to 
ensure the risks are mitigated properly. The core issue of this principle is a provision of an efficient allocation 
of resources across the AML/CFT regime and the implementation of risk-based efforts throughout the FATF 
recommendations. Jurisdictions are required to understand the ML/TF risks on their national level and manage 
discovered risks proportionately.  
The second principle: it is necessary to determine the scope of NRA. Different types of assessments are al-
lowed for applying and combining to reach a national-level understanding of the ML/TF risks. Herewith, the 
FATF encourages attempts to consider macro-level risks influencing the AML/CFT regime. FATF provided 
examples of factors that may be regarded for the assessment of overall situation in the country including 
political, economic, social, technological, environmental and geographical, as well as legislative factors.  
The third principle requires that the NRA assessment shall be comprehensive. FATF strongly recommends 
the jurisdictions to provide enough relevant assessment of ML/TF risk based on sufficient analysis of possible 
threats and vulnerabilities as well as their consequences.  
The last principle states that it is essential to have a high-level commitment subject to the assessment of ap-
propriate risks. Officials of any jurisdiction shall recognize the ML/TF risks existing within their country. 
They are required to understand and acknowledge any of such risks.  
The analysis of the publicly available NRA reports and releases of several jurisdictions (see Table 1 in Ap-
pendix) [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13] gives us a possibility to conclude that very often NRA covers the following areas 
of the overall situation in a country: geopolitical, governance and legal framework, social and economic factors. 
Corruption and terrorism are of great importance and paid significant attention by the jurisdictions. The areas 
defined in Table 1 were considered by the countries not necessarily separately. Very often corruption is covered 
within the analysis of political or economic environment as well as one of types of criminal activity, for example, 
Singapore, Ukraine and Ireland consider corruption as a component of their political environment but Canada 
assesses it as a separate overall money laundering threat.  
It is obvious that a comprehensive analysis of the abovemenioned areas require significant resources and efforts at 
a country level. However, it is not the key focus but either an essential part for NRA of the ML/TF risks. 
Herewith, many different indices, indicators and ratings cover the variety of areas allowing to have quantitate esti-
mates of political stability, peace, terrorism, corruption, economic environment and social development, etc. These 
modern indices come from profound scientific studies and rely on knowledge, comprehensive data and up-to-date 
methodology. For example, the Global Terrorism Index built by the Institute for Economics and Peace is based on 
data from the Global Terrorism Database maintained by the National consortium for the study of terrorism and 
responses to terrorism at the University of Maryland. This database is recognized to be the most valuable source of 
information on terrorist activity globally and covers over 140 000 terrorist incidents [2]. The next example is the 
State Fragile Index developed by the Fund for Peace produced through the application of the Fund’s own analytical 
platform called Conflict Assessment System Tool and backed by analysis of millions of documents every year. 
The countries are ranked considering twelve key political, social and economic indicators that are based themselves 
on over 100 sub-indicators [3]. Given examples prove that recognized and reputable indices could be considered 
as a valuable source of information for the NRA. 
At the same time, the utilization of indices and indicators of any kind requires deep understanding of their 
nature and methodology. Once decided upon utilization of a set of certain indices, anyone would face such 
challenges as random number of indices for each area, various methodologies for calculation of indices, di-
versity of scales, etc. As the result, it is impossible to make enough objective conclusions based on figures of 
various indices for a jurisdiction without their bringing to a single scale based exceptionally on subjective 
expertise. Moreover, the NRA shall be performed periodically and it is extremely hard to study the dynamics 
and perform any comparison analysis based on subjective assessments of number of experts.  
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Therefore, this study is an attempt to develop an approach for indices-based analysis subject to certain tasks 
of the NRA of the ML/TF risks. For this purpose it was decided to conduct analysis in Ukraine concerning 
already defined core areas of the overall situation in a country considered within its NRA.  
At the first stage a range of indices and indicators credible from our point of view (see Table 2 in Appendix) 
were chosen. Besides indices given in Table 2 there is only one absolute indicator. Illicit financial flows from 
developing countries are measured in million US dollars [11]. To bring the measurement of this indicator in 
line with the spirit of the rest chosen indices, the percentage of the volume of illicit flows to the GDP [10] by 
countries was calculated. Hereinafter the authors consider the percentage of the illicit flow to GDP.  
At the second stage a dataset containing actual maximum, minimum values and values for Ukraine of the 
listed in the table 2 indices and indicators for the years 2011-2015 [11, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, 35, 
36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42] was formed. While composing this dataset, authors faced with a lack of some 
figures, that’s why the missing figures were simulated. The volumes of illicit financial flows from developing 
countries are available for the years 2004-2013 [11]. To simulate data for 2014 and 2015, average minimum, 
maximum and median for 9 years period from 2004 and 2013were calculated. The figure on the volume of 
illicit flows from Ukraine for 2015 was taken from a mass media publication [31] and an appropriate figure 
for 2014 was calculated as an average for 2013 and 2015. The Basel AML Index is calculated staring from 
2012, so the figures for Ukraine, median, minimum and maximum for 2011 were calculated as an average for 
5 years from 2012 to 2016. The figures of the Human Development Index for 2015 were calculated as averages 
for 2011-2014. The figures of the Global Terrorism Index for 2012 were calculated as averages for 2011 and 
2013. The scale for the Corruption Perception Index was changed in 2012 for the one from 0 to 100, before it 
was from 0 to 10. That is why the figures of this index for 2011 were multiplied by 10 to make them compa-
rable with the rest. 
The main challenge resaerchers faced on this stage was choosing a single approach to measure existing posi-
tion of Ukraine comparing to the rest jurisdictions ranked. Also, there were the challenges already mentioned 
before: the indices developed upon various methodologies, they cover random number of jurisdictions, their 
scales are different and they are correlated to some extent. So, it was decided to calculate a median for each 
index and indicator from our list to understand which estimations are typical for the whole number of juris-
dictions ranked (see Table 3 in Appendix). 
At the third stage a visualization by each index from the dataset (see Figures from 1 to 11 in Appendix) was 
performed. Considering the results of visualization it is possible to distinguish several trends. For Doing Busi-
ness, the Economic Freedom Index and the Global Competitiveness Index, the Basel AML Index – the median 
is nearly equals the mean. The limits of fluctuation of correspondence of median to mean vary from 0.9859 
to 1.0105. The medians of the Fragile States Index, the International Property Rights Index and the Corruption 
Perception Index are shifted toward the worst meanings. Medians of the Global Terrorism Index, the Global 
Peace Index and the Human Development Index are shifted to the best figures. The most fluctuant appeared 
to be ratio of the volume of illicit flows from developing countries to their GDP. On average its median counts 
for 4.58% and the minimum always equals to zero for 2011-2015. Herewith, the maximum varies from 
714.29% in 2011 to 131.4% in 2013 in a random manner. To our point of view, medians of the considered 
indices are quantitate estimations of the most likely situation in the majority of countries rated. 
At the fourth stage the analysis of Ukraine’s situation considering the median of the indices was conducted. 
Authors took the medians as average thresholds throughout ranked countries according to the principle that 
such average for most countries shall be a kind of required minimum. Then figures for Ukraine were compared 
with the medians. All the indexes from our dataset were considered according to their scales and divided into 
two types. The first type was designated to indices if their higher value means better result. The second type 
was designated to those which higher value means worse result (see Table 2 in Appendix). To find how much 
Ukraine lags behind / higher than the median there, for the 1st type of indices ratios between the figure for 
Ukraine and the median and for the 2nd type of indices ratios between median and figure for Ukraine were 
calculated. The calculated figures were deducted from 1 to measure proportions lacking for Ukraine to reach 
in fact the most likely situation in the majority of countries. Then absolute increases in lacking proportions in 
comparison with the first reference period of 2011 by each index and arithmetic means of these increments 
(see Table 4 in Appendix) were calculated.  
At the fifth stage a histogram was built on the basis of arithmetic mean of absolute increases in lacking pro-
portions by each index (see Figure 12). Analyzing this visualization, it is possible to split indices into four 
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main groups concerning Ukraine. The first group of indices includes those on which Ukraine demonstrated 
the biggest gap increase between its ranks and the average thresholds (median) throughout ranked countries 
in the negative meaning. These are the Global Peace Index, the Corruption Perception Index and the Global 
Terrorism Index. Such outcomes are expected due to escalation of external aggression for Ukraine in 2014-
2015. Moreover, the existence of strong correlation between corruption and peace [44] is already proved. 
According to Transparency International, 5 of the 10 countries with the highest levels of corruption are also 
among the 10 least peaceful countries on the globe [43]. The second group of indices includes the Fragile 
States Index, the International Property Rights Index and the Ratio of Illicit flows to GDP on which Ukraine 
demonstrated slight negative growth. The third group covers the Index of Economic Freedom, the Human 
Development Index and the Basel AML Index that kept stable with no sizeable changes as a whole. And the 
last fourth group includes the indices on which Ukraine had negative average absolute increase in lacking 
proportions meaning that it has improved its position on such indices. These are the Global Competitiveness 
Index and the Doing Business. 
For the purposes of the NRA, it is necessary to define the priority of certain areas of the overall situation in a 
country. When we started analysis for Ukraine the indices and indicators in our dataset were distributed among 
the following key areas (see Table 2 in Appendix): geopolitical situation, governance and legal framework, 
economic and social development, terrorism and corruption. To define the priority of the area considering 
both the quantity of indices and average absolute increase in lacking proportions of each index for area, an 
average score for each area (see Table 5 in Appendix) reflecting an overall priority of the area was calculated. 
The lower the score, the higher priority of the area shall be.  
Subject to our calculations for Ukraine performed on the dataset containing figures by 11 indices and indica-
tors for years 2011-2015, the levels of areas priority at the national level for the purposes of the NRA of 
ML/TF risks were defined. The following areas were designated as the most vulnerable areas considering an 
average absolute increase in proportions lacking (measured in the negative meaning) for Ukraine to reach the 
most likely situation in the majority of ranked countries: terrorism, corruption and geopolitical situation.  
5. Conclusions 
The necessity to consider the general situation in the country when concluding on findings of the NRA and 
deciding on allocation of available resources for mitigation of the discovered ML/TF risks in a jurisdiction 
requires appropriate techniques. Such techniques shall be both comprehensive and flexible. Herewith, if they 
will allow regular (periodical) monitoring of the situation, it will be a plus. Proposed approach gives a possi-
bility to analyze a wide range of information represented though various indices, ratings and indicators already 
based on extended data and comprehensive analysis. It allows determining priorities for considered areas of 
the overall situation in a jurisdiction based on objective calculations. Participants of the NRA of the ML/TF 
risks could benefit using such approach. The participants of the NRA should decide themselves on the list or 
areas and indices to be considered. The existance of a single methodology for indices-based analysis makes 
the results clear for every participant. Also, the approach ensures possibility to update information when nec-
essary. Consequently, such approach could ensure an efficient utilization of available resources and provide 
a technique for consideration of significant volume of information. 
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Appendices 
Table 1. Core areas of the overall situation in a country considered within the NRA of ML/TF risks 
Country, year of 
NRA report / 
release 
Areas considered 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ireland (2016) 
Geographical, po-
litical environ-
ment 
Legal, judicial and in-
stitutional framework 
for AML/CFT 
Economic  
environment 
Terrorism Corruption 
Ukraine (2016) 
Political stability, 
peace  
Governance and 
legal framework for 
AML/CFT 
Economic development 
and social issues 
Terrorism Corruption 
Canada (2015) 
Geopolitical  
situation 
Governance and legal 
framework for 
AML/CFT 
Socio-economic fea-
tures 
Terrorism Corruption 
United Kingdom 
(2015) 
- 
Legal and regulatory 
framework governing 
AML/CFT regime 
International ML threats 
including UK’s status as 
a global financial center 
Terrorist 
financing 
PEPs, interna-
tional corrup-
tion cases 
Japan (2014) 
Geographic  
environment 
AML/CFT regime 
Economic  
environment 
Terrorist fi-
nancing 
PEPs 
Malaysia (2013) Geographical 
Legal (mainly for 
AML/CFT) 
Economy Terrorism Corruption 
Singapore (2013) 
Geographical, po-
litical environ-
ment 
Legal, judicial and in-
stitutional framework 
(mainly for 
AML/CFT) 
Economic  
environment 
Terrorism Corruption 
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Table 2. The list of considered indices and ratings 
Area assessed by the index / 
indicator 
Name of index / indicator Type Developer of the index / indicator 
1 2 3 4 
Geopolitical situation 
Global Peace Index II Institute for Economics and Peace 
Fragile States Index II The Fund for Peace 
Governance and legal 
framework 
Basel AML Index II The Basel Institute on Governance 
Illicit Financial Flows from De-
veloping Countries 
II Global Financial Integrity 
International Property Rights 
Index 
I Property Rights Alliance 
Economic and social devel-
opment 
Global Competitiveness Index I World Economic Forum 
Doing Business I World Bank 
Index of Economic Freedom I Wall Street Journal and Heritage Foundation 
Human Development Index I United Nations Development Program 
Terrorism Global Terrorism Index II Institute for Economics and Peace 
Corruption Corruption Perception Index I Transparency International 
Table 3. Actual maximum, minimum values, median and values for Ukraine of the given indices  
and indicators for 2011-2015 
Index / indicator  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Global Peace Index 
Ukraine 1.995 1.953 2.238 2.546 2.845 
Actual Minimum Value 1.148 1.113 1.162 1.189 1.148 
Actual Maximum Value 3.379 3.392 3.44 3.65 3.645 
Median 2.046 1.998 2.0545 2.0035 1.9875 
Fragile States Index 
Ukraine 69 67.2 65.9 67.2 76.3 
Actual Minimum Value 19.7 20 18 18.7 17.8 
Actual Maximum Value 113.4 114.9 113.9 112.9 114.5 
Median 76 75.1 75.2 75.1 74.6 
Basel AML Index 
Ukraine 6.554 6.62 6.47 6.55 6.56 
Actual Minimum Value 2.724 2.36 3.17 2.51 2.53 
Actual Maximum Value 8.576 8.57 8.55 8.56 8.59 
Median 5.81 5.75 5.86 5.84 5.79 
Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries (to GDP, %) 
Ukraine 11% 11.95% 7.59% 10.53% 15.67% 
Actual Minimum Value 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Actual Maximum Value 714.29% 252.08% 131.4% 344.83% 344.83% 
Median 4.64% 4.96% 3.68% 4.82% 4.82% 
International Property Rights Index 
Ukraine 4 4 4.2 4.3 3.9 
Actual Minimum Value 2.5 2.85 2.85 3.2 2.5 
Actual Maximum Value 8.65 8.6 8.6 8.5 8.9 
Median 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.3 
Global Competitiveness Index 
Ukraine 3.901 4 4.139 4.052 4.139 
Actual Minimum Value 2.732 2.87 2.779 2.851 2.793 
Actual Maximum Value 5.630 5.737 5.722 5.666 5.704 
Мedian 4.139 4.186 4.141 4.13 4.198 
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Table 3 (cont.). Actual maximum, minimum values, median and values for Ukraine of the given indices  
and indicators for 2011-2015 
Index / indicator  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Doing Business 
Ukraine 44.21 44.35 48.87 58.14 61.83 
Actual Minimum Value 27.51 31.62 31.7 32.06 26.4 
Actual Maximum Value 90.4 90.41 90.38 91.24 86.7 
Median 60.04 60.51 61.91 62.34 60.6 
Index of Economic Freedom 
Ukraine 46.9 49.3 46.3 46.1 45.8 
Actual Minimum Value 1 1 1.5 1 1.3 
Actual Maximum Value 89.7 89.9 89.3 90.1 89.6 
Median 60 60.1 59.6 60 60.1 
Human Development Index 
Ukraine 0.738 0.743 0.746 0.747 0.744 
Actual Minimum Value 0.333 0.342 0.345 0.348 0.342 
Actual Maximum Value 0.941 0.942 0.942 0.944 0.942 
Median 0.7155 0.7205 0.7225 0.724 0.720625 
Global Terrorism Index 
Ukraine 2.16 2.555 2.95 7.2 7.133 
Actual Minimum Value 0 0 0 0 0 
Actual Maximum Value 9.56 9.78 10 10 9.96 
Median 0.99 1.0425 1.095 1.993 1.631 
Corruption Perception Index 
Ukraine 27 26 25 26 27 
Actual Minimum Value 10 8 8 8 8 
Actual Maximum Value 95 90 91 92 91 
Median 32 37 38 38 37 
Table 4. Proportions lacking for Ukraine to reach median of indices and their absolute increase 
Indices 
Proportions lacking for Ukraine to reach median 
Absolute increase in comparison with first 
reference period of 2011 Average abso-
lute increase 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Global Peace In-
dex 
-0.0256 -0.0230 0.0820 0.2131 0.3014 0.0025 0.1076 0.2386 0.3270 0.1689 
Fragile States In-
dex  
-0.1013 -0.1168 -0.1418 -0.1176 0.0223 -0.0155 -0.0405 -0.0163 0.1236 0.0128 
Basel AML Index 0.1135 0.1314 0.0943 0.1084 0.1174 0.0179 -0.0192 -0.0051 0.0039 -0.0006 
Illicit flows to 
GDP, % 
0.5782 0.5850 0.5148 0.5424 0.6926 0.0068 -0.0635 -0.0358 0.1143 0.0055 
International 
Property Rights 
Index 
0.2157 0.2357 0.1975 0.1887 0.2642 0.0200 -0.0182 -0.0270 0.0485 0.0058 
Global Competi-
tiveness Index 
0.0574 0.0444 0.0005 0.0189 0.0142 -0.0130 -0.0569 -0.0385 -0.0432 -0.0379 
Doing Business 0.2637 0.2671 0.2106 0.0674 -0.0203 0.0034 -0.0530 -0.1963 -0.2840 -0.1325 
Index of Economic 
Freedom 
0.2183 0.1797 0.2232 0.2320 0.2375 -0.0386 0.0048 0.0136 0.0192 -0.0002 
Human Develop-
mentIndex 
-0.0314 -0.0312 -0.0325 -0.0318 -0.0317 0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 
Global  
Terrorism Index  
0.5417 0.5920 0.6288 0.7232 0.7713 0.0503 0.0871 0.1815 0.2297 0.1372 
Corruption  
Perception Index 
0.1563 0.2973 0.3421 0.3158 0.2703 0.1410 0.1859 0.1595 0.1140 0.1501 
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Table 5. Overall priority for the area 
Area assessed by 
index / indicator 
Name of index / indicator 
Group subject to average absolute increase in lacking 
proportions 
Overall priority 
for the area 
1 2 3 4 5 
Terrorism Global Terrorism Index The biggest increase of gap  1 1 
Corruption Corruption Perception Index The biggest increase of gap  1 1 
Geopolitical situ-
ation 
Global Peace Index The biggest increase of gap  1 
1,5 
Fragile States Index Slight negative growth 2 
Governance and 
legal framework 
Basel AML Index Stable with no sizeable changes 3 
2,33 
Illicit Financial Flows from 
Developing Countries 
Slight negative growth 2 
International Property Rights 
Index 
Slight negative growth 
2 
Economic and so-
cial development 
Global Competitiveness Index Improved 4 
3,5 
Doing Business Improved 4 
Index of Economic Freedom Stable with no sizeable changes 3 
Human Development Index Stable with no sizeable changes 3 
 
Figure 1. Doing Business Index, 2011-2015 
 
Figure 2. Economic Freedom Index, 2011-2015 
 
Figure 3. Global Competitiveness Index, 2011-2015 
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Figure 4. Corruption Perception Index 2011-2015 
 
Figure 5. International Property Rights Index, 2011-2015  
 
Figure 6. Human Development Index, 2011-2015 
 
Figure 7. Fragile States Index, 2011-2015  
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Figure 8. Illicit flows from developing countries to GDP, % 2011-2015 
 
Figure 9. Basel AML Index, 2011-2015 
 
Figure 10. Global Peace Index, 2011-2015  
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Figure 11. Global Terrorism Index, 2011-2015 
 
Figure 12. Average absolute increase in lacking proportions for Ukraine 
